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CHAPTER ONE
STUDY OVERVIEW AND RATIONALE
Historically, cognitive functions have been studied within a vacuum void of affective
input or grounded within discrete diagnostic classifications, such as depression or schizophrenia
(Blanchette & Richards, 2010; Mitchell & Phillips, 2007). More recently, academic and clinical
interests regarding the interaction between dimensional affective processes and cognition have
increased (Blanchette & Richards, 2010; Blanchard-Fields, 2005; Mitchell & Phillips, 2007;
Yiend, 2004), largely in response to the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) Research
Domain Criteria Initiative (RDoC; Insel & Cuthbert, 2009). In order to more accurately
characterize dimensions of function that underlie the range of normal to abnormal human
behavior, the RDoC encourages applying dimensional approaches to transcend traditional
categorical nosology regarding normal and abnormal psychological function and integrate
information across multiple methods/levels of analysis (Insel & Cuthbert, 2009).
Within the broader domain of cognitive systems, RDoC identifies cognitive control as a
dimension of human behavior necessitating further investigation. Cognitive control processes,
which are also commonly referred to as executive functions (EFs), are the mechanisms through
which humans use internal intentions to guide thought and behavior (Banich, 2009). Miller and
Cohen (2001) describe cognitive control as higher-order processes that optimize and schedule
lower-order processes. Further, cognitive
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control processes are engaged when prepotent (predominant, more automatic) modes of
responding are not sufficient to meet contextual demands experienced during daily life as well as
in completion of experimental tasks. The ability to refrain from prepotent response patterns in
favor of more regulated responding requires the engagement of inhibitory-related cognitive
control processes.
For almost a century, modified versions of the classic Color-Word Stroop Test (CWST,
Stroop, 1935; Klein, 1964; Delis et al., 2001) have been utilized to investigate cognitive
function, including inhibitory-related cognitive control processes (Harnishfeger, 1995; MacLeod,
1991). The CWST requires cognitive control processes to engage during conflict situations to
disregard irrelevant stimulus information and maintain task instructions (thus ignoring a
prepotent response option) in order to make an appropriate response. A correct response in the
context of conflicting stimulus input reflects the successful processing of interference. The
CWST has been used to measure the range of normative EF abilities to deficits in pathological
populations (Lufi, Cohen & Parnish-Plass, 1990; Wagner et al., 2006; West, 2004).
Despite common use of the CWST, little is known regarding the influence of naturally
occurring state affect on the recruitment /allocation of cognitive control resources during
interference processing. Affect is an individual’s subjective experience of emotion (Diener, Suh,
Lucas & Smith, 1999). Affect can be represented by state and trait components (Watson, Clark &
Carey, 1988). While trait affect represents relatively stable patterns of emotional experience,
state affect is thought to vary over time in relation to exogenous and endogenous factors
(Watson, Clark & Carey, 1988). Within this context, state affect can also be referred to as an
individual’s mood or mood state, and reflects current emotional experience at time of
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assessment. Although laboratory-based explorations of affect have largely utilized mood
induction procedures to create greater positive or negative mood states within participants,
individual differences in naturalistic state affect can be measured without induction (Blanchette
& Richards, 2009; Mitchell & Phillips, 2007). While induced mood differentially influences
components of cognitive control (Bartolic, Basso, Schefft, Glauser, & Titanic-Schefft, 1999;
Blanchette & Richards, 2009; Mitchell & Phillips, 2007), understanding how everyday mood
impacts EF is not as well characterized.
Most behavioral and neuroimaging studies of the CWST in “healthy” populations have
not explored the potential role of natural state affect or previous psychopathology, yet evidence
from several studies indicate that these factors may indeed play a role in behavioral and
neurophysiological response (Heller, 1993; Liotti, Mayberg, McGinnis, Brannan, & Jerabek,
2002). In fact, the interplay between cognitive and affective processing is evident within the
structural and functional organization of the cortex, such that frontocingulate cortical structures
that support affective function also are engaged during cognitive tasks, and vice versa (Mohanty
et al., 2007).
Electroencephalography (EEG) is a noninvasive method of monitoring electrical activity
elicited by the brain. EEG measures excitatory and inhibitory postsynaptic potentials of highly
synchronized cortical neurons (Luck, 2012). Recorded EEG activity may be time-locked to
specific events in order to analyze event-related potentials (ERPs). ERPs are stereotyped
electrophysiological responses that are recognizable as peaks and troughs within the EEG
waveform. ERPs are observed in response to endogenous or exogenous stimuli and provide
measurement of neural response within milliseconds of stimulus onset. The temporal specificity

4
of event-related potentials (ERPs) makes them an ideal vehicle for examining the sequential
dynamics of affective state on cognitive control processes engaged during the CWST. Previous
investigations have identified several ERP components relevant to the CWST; however,
methodological differences across studies have contributed to mixed findings.
The purpose of this study is two-fold. First, this investigation aims to further
clarify/elucidate the nature and time course of cognitive resources engaged during the CWST
within a sample of healthy controls and participants with remitted depression. Healthy controls
were identified as individuals with no current or lifetime history of psychiatric illness and
individuals with a lifetime history of depression who do not currently meet diagnostic criteria for
a major depressive episode were included in the remitted depressed group. Consistent with
previous research, this study proposes that neural resources will be differentially recruited and
allocated dependent on task-related demands (presence or absence of interference). Secondly,
given the established interplay between affect, cognition and behavior, the present investigation
also aims to investigate how naturally occurring positive mood will influence recruitment of
cognitive resources and behavioral performance during interference processing.
Investigating dimensional variations in state affect, including naturally occurring positive
mood, is important as affect has been found to influence abilities essential for day-to-day
functioning. Greater understanding of the influence of naturally occurring state affect on EF has
implications for cognitive interventions, as cognitive demands are likely influenced differently
by high and low levels of positive and negative affect. The exploration of state affect and EF
may help to answer questions such as, “how do individual factors influence the ability to
overcome cognitive conflict/interference and effectively direct behavior and actions?” Naturally
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occurring Positive affect is theorized to be a key individual difference factor that influences the
neural correlates of cognitive function.
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CHAPTER TWO
REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE
Affect
Variations in mood (affective state) and dispositional affectivity (affective trait) have
been found to significantly influence everyday activities by modulating thoughts and actions
(Blanchette & Richards, 2010). Foundational literature has established the dominance of two
dimensions of valenced affective experience: Positive Affect (PA) and Negative Affect (NA)
(Davidson, 1998; Heller, 1993; Russell & Carroll, 1999; Russell & Pratt, 1980; Watson & Clark,
1991; Watson & Tellegen, 1985). The present project conceptualizes PA and NA as discrete
variables in accordance with the seminal works of Watson, Clark, and Tellegen (Clark &
Watson, 1991; Watson & Tellegen, 1985; Watson & Clark, 1991; Watson, Clark & Tellegen,
1988); however, it should be acknowledged that the extant literature is charged with debate as to
whether PA and NA represent two relatively orthogonal facets of affect, or are better
conceptualized as bipolar extremes of a singular dimension (Barret & Russell, 1999; Carroll,
Yik, Russell, Barret, 1999; Kendall et al., 2015; Russell, 1980). While recent research has
explored additional affective dimensions of intensity, frequency, and arousal (Brown, Chorpita &
Barlow, 1998; Diener, Larsen, Levine & Emmons, 1985; Heller, 1993; Larsen & Diener, 1987),
the present investigation focuses primarily on PA
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State affect/mood represents transient fluctuations in emotional experience. As such,
methods assessing state affect focus on an individual’s current experience of emotion across a
limited span of time (e.g., several hours or a day). State PA reflects how
much an individual feels enthusiastic, active and alert across a specified time constraint.
Individuals experiencing high state PA often endorse affirmative mood states such as feeling
pleased, engaged, and/or energetic. On the opposing extreme of the PA dimension, individuals
experiencing low state PA often describe feelings of lethargy and apathy. Therefore low state PA
is characterized by the absence of pleasantness, vigor, and interest. State NA reflects subjective
feelings of distress and engagement in unpleasurable experience (Watson & Clark, 1997; Watson
& Tellegen, 1985; Watson & Naragon-Gainey, 2010). An individual experiencing high state NA
may describe multiple aversive states such as anger, fear, nervousness, disgust, and hatred. In
contrast, low state NA is effectively represented in tranquility and peace.
Positive and Negative Affect: Distinct but Related Dimensional Psychological Constructs
Building upon previous findings (Bradburn and Caplovitz, 1965), Bradburn (1969)
proposed that psychological well-being is best conceptualized as a function of two independent
dimensions, positive and negative affect. Citing evidence from several national samples,
Bradburn (1969) found, that when measured separately, PA and NA varied independently. In
other words, the amount of PA endorsed by an individual did not substantially correlate with the
level of endorsed NA. Prior to Bradburn’s seminal works, most researchers had conceptualized
affect as a single hedonic dimension with PA and NA defined and measured as bipolar opposites.
By allowing positive and negative affect to vary independently, subsequent research has found
that PA and NA often correlate differently with other psychological and neurobiological
6
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variables (Cherlin & Reeder, 1975; Harding, 1982; Warr, 1978; Heller, Nitschke & Miller, 1998;
Mitchell & Phillips, 2007).
The two-dimensional structure of PA and NA has also been validated and applied within
the empirical and clinical domains of psychopathology. Given significant overlap in
symptomatology/diagnostic comorbidity between depressive and anxiety disorders, clarifying
etiological distinctions and maintenance factors of illness became a significant focus of work in
order to improve measurement sensitivity and specificity. The tripartite model of depression and
anxiety theorizes that low positive affect (PA) is specific to depression and anxious arousal is
specific to anxiety. The model also asserts that high NA is a common factor of both depression
and anxiety (Clark & Watson, 1991; Watson, Clark & Carey, 1988; Watson, Clark & Tellegen,
1988). High NA has also more broadly been viewed as a potential general risk factor for
psychopathology (Clark and Watson, 1991, 1994; Mineka et al. 1998) and low PA has been
specifically related to the psychiatric construct of anhedonia (Blanchard, Mueser, & Bellack,
1998; Crawford & Henry, 2004; Kendall et al., 2015). Watson and colleagues (1995) directly
tested the predictions of the tripartite model on student, adult, and psychiatric patient samples
through the administration of the Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire (MASQ; Watson
& Clark, 1991). Findings indicated superior diagnostic classification of depressive and anxiety
disorders with incorporation of tripartite model (i.e., depression was differentiated via low levels
of PA).
Evidence from neuroscience. Complementing conventional research that has postulated
PA and NA as distinct but related affective dimensions, human neuroscience research has treated
these primary affective dimensions in a similar manner with the goal of mapping them onto brain
structures and functions. Dating to observations from lesion studies in the early 1970s (e.g.,
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Gainotti, 1972), affect implementation in the brain has been conceptualized as lateralized, with
structures supporting pleasant affect lateralized to left prefrontal cortex (PFC) and those
supporting unpleasant affect lateralized to right PFC (Heller, Nitschke, & Miller, 1998). Results
of electroencephalographic (EEG) studies have consistently evidenced increased cerebral
activation in the left hemisphere relative to activation of the right atmosphere during positive
mood states (Allen & Kline, 2004; Cacioppo, 2004; Davidson, Ekman, Saron, Senulis, &
Friesen, 1990; Heller, 1993; Heller, Nitschke, Etienne, & Miller, 1997; Heller, Nitschke, &
Miller, 1998) as well as relative greater activation in the right hemisphere compared to left
during negative mood states (Davidson et al., 1990; Heller, Nitschke, & Miller, 1998; Lee et al.,
2004). Blunted positive and negative affectivity have been associated with bilateral decreases in
prefrontal cortical activity (Davidson, 1998). These findings further support the proposal that PA
and NA should be treated as distinct but related dimensional psychological constructs.
In summary, a large body of work, ranging from self-report to neurophysiological
methodologies, subdivides affect into two distinct yet related affective dimensions based upon
valence (PA and NA). Additionally, variations in individual experience of PA and NA can be
dimensionally assessed through self-report measures such as the Positive and Negative Affect
Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Given the relative independence of these
affective dimensions, a low rating of one dimension does not necessitate a high rating of the
other dimension.
Affect and Cognitive Control
Affective processing of both endogenous and exogenous information is fundamental to
human behavior. As such, all decisions and actions occur in an affective context in which
cognitive processes, such as cognitive control, are constantly modulated by affective state.

10
Commonalities across several theories of cognitive control suggest that cognitive control
processes are engaged when: (a) resisting distracting/task-irrelevant input; (b) inhibiting
familiar/stereotyped behaviors; (c) creating and maintaining attentional set; (d)
prioritizing/sequencing behaviors; (e) shifting task-demands; (f) utilizing relevant information
for decision making; (g) organizing/categorizing conceptually-related information about stimuli;
and (h) processing novel input regarding task demands and situational context (Banich, 2009;
Friedman & Miyake, 2004).
A growing body of work provides evidence for the role of affect in cognitive control
processes. While many studies have examined differences in cognitive control processes across
categorical classifications of abnormal affective function (i.e., various psychiatric illnesses), less
is known regarding the dimensional influence of naturally occurring positive and negative mood
states on cognitive control. The following section first examines psychological theories of affect
and cognitive control and then reviews empirical investigations of cognitive processes in the
context of affect. While only literature investigating the effects of affect/mood on cognition will
be examined, it should be acknowledged that executive processes may play an important role in
the maintenance and regulation of mood as well, as is likely true in the context of cognitive
reappraisal (Hofmann, Schmeichel & Baddeley, 2012; Ochsner et al., 2004; Buhle et al., 2014).
Psychological Theories of Affect and Cognitive Control
Several psychological theories posit unique implications when examining the effects of
mood or state affect on cognition/cognitive control. While the majority of research supporting
these theories has focused on induced-affect/mood, considerations may be drawn for natural state
characteristics as well.
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Affect and cognitive load/resource depletion. This framework of affect and cognitive
control underscores that human processing capacity is limited (Kahneman, 1973) and that
competition for neural resources will occur under conditions of dual demands (Broadbent, 1958;
Treisman & Gelade, 1980; Underwood, 1977). As such, both positive and negative affective
states would be expected to burden cognitive resources in comparison to neutral states due to the
associated increased activation of widespread networks involved in emotion-related processing.
For example, the presence of high NA has been associated with rumination about mood-relevant
thoughts, which may be task-irrelevant (Mitchell & Phillips, 2007; Ottowitz, Dougherty &
Savage, 2002). According to resource depletion theory, the engagement in task-irrelevant
processing decreases available resources/capacity to engage in presented cognitive tasks.
Therefore, according to this framework high levels of both PA and NA would have detrimental
effects on cognitive control tasks, including inhibitory-related functions tapped during Stroop
interference processing.
Affect and information processing style. The feelings-as-information framework set
forth by Schwarz, Clore and colleagues (Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz & Bohner, 1996; Schwarz &
Clore, 1996) initially postulated that an individual’s present affect informs him or her about the
“goodness” or “badness” of the environment, which then influences subsequent information
processing style. PA has been associated with increased utilization of heuristic and creative
processing styles in comparison to neutral moods (Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, & Strack, 1990;
Bodenhausen et al., 1994; Bohner, Chaiken & Hunyadi, 1994). It is thought that given the
absence of threats in the environment (as assumed when experiencing PA), an individual’s
motivation to alter his or her environment is attenuated and therefore opens resources for more
creative processing styles. In contrast, experience of NA generally signals that the environment
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is problematic and that action should be taken to alter current circumstances. Therefore,
according to the feelings-as-information framework, NA results in an information processing
style that is relatively systematic, effortful, and vigilant.
Others have also categorized PA as inducing more global/holistic information processing
attributes, with negative affect prompting a more localized/focused analysis of information
(Bolte, Goschke & Kuhl, 2003; Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005). Similar to the feelings-asinformation framework discussed above, the broaden-and-build theory set forth by Fredrickson
(1998; 2001) contends that positive emotions broaden attentional scope and expands transient
thought-action repertoires. By increasing cognitive access to various potential thoughts and
actions, positive emotion ultimately increases the likelihood of engaging in thoughts and actions
beyond basic functional requirements. Examples of thoughts and behaviors related to positive
emotion include play, exploration, savoring, and complex integration (Fredrickson, 2001). The
theory also highlights the adaptive benefits of select negative emotions (e.g., anger and anxiety)
momentarily limiting available thought-action repertoires to increase likelihood of engaging in
context-appropriate action (Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005). A number of empirical studies
support the broaden-and-build account of mood on attentional focus. For example, Biss, Hasher
and Thomas (2010) found that individuals in a positive mood were more likely than others to
utilize previously irrelevant information (distractor stimuli on a previous task) to facilitate
performance on a subsequent implicit task. Results from this study support a broader, more
global focus of processing under conditions of high PA as positive mood was associated with
implicit use of distraction.
Rowe, Hirsh and Anderson (2007) investigated the effects of positive, neutral, and sad
mood induction on visuospatial (Eriksen Flanker task) and conceptual (remote associates task,
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RAT) attentional domains. No significant differences were found on performances for either task
between sad and neutral inductions, however positive mood induction was related to increased
access to semantic associations on the RAT and impaired visual selective attention on the
Flanker task. Together, these results were interpreted to suggest that high PA attenuates
inhibitory control to increase breadth of conceptual and visuospatial attention.
Storbeck and Clore (2005) examined whether induced positive or negative moods would
influence the formation of false memories in two related studies. Utilizing the Deese-RoedigerMcDermott paradigm, which lures individuals to produce false memories, Storbeck and Clore
(2005) found that negative mood resulted in attenuated false memory effects compared to
positive mood and non-manipulated mood groups. To further examine whether this effect took
place at the point of encoding or retrieval, a second study required participants to list words they
identified as related to the target list of words but were not actually included on the list. Results
indicated no interaction between lure identification type (lure listed as a part of the target list or
lure identified as a related word) and mood induction. However, a main effect for mood
induction found that individuals within the negative mood group were less likely to identify lures
in general, which supported differences in mood-related processing style at the stage of encoding
rather than retrieval. Overall, these findings suggest negative mood is related to a more refined,
limited-scope of processing when encoding information in comparison to positive mood.
Affect-as-cognitive-feedback account. Emerging in response to empirical evidence
contradicting the fixed effects of PA and NA on cognition, affect-as-cognitive feedback theory
suggests that the relation between affect and cognitive processing is malleable (Huntsinger
2014). This viewpoint asserts that the impact of mood on perceptual processing/attentional scope
depends upon accessibility of global or local processing orientations, with positive mood
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generally amplifying whichever processing style is contextually dominant. This theory also
suggests that when global and local orientations are equally accessible, differences in mood will
not be related to differences in attentional scope.
Several studies provide supporting evidence for this theory. Huntsinger, Clore and BarAnan (2010) examined the relation between positive mood and processing focus (global or local)
across two experiments with each utilizing different mood induction, perspective priming, and
assessment methodologies to increase generalizability. Results from both studies indicated that
positive mood amplified processing type dependent on which focus was primed. In other words,
positive mood was not wholly related to global processing, but rather facilitated adaptation of
context-specific processing in comparison to negative mood. These findings were further
substantiated in more recent work by Huntsinger (2012), which examined the effects of focal
priming on performance during a flanker task. Flanker tasks assess an individual’s perceptual
attention and inhibitory control. The task requires participants to focus on a target stimulus while
inhibiting attention to distracter stimuli flanking it. Results indicated that positive mood was
related to adaptation of whichever perceptual orientation was primed. Further, when global and
local orientations were primed equally, affect was not found to influence scope of attention.
Given the above theoretical frameworks, it is evident that the pertinent question is not
whether mood state influences cognition/cognitive control, but rather how mood state influences
these higher order processes. Models rooted in concepts of limited capacity and resource
depletion, suggest that affective input is deleterious to cognitive control processes as it occupies
related and limited resources. In contrast, recent advances in theories of information processing
and mood suggest an increasingly malleable role between cognitive approach and affective state.
More specifically, high positive affect increases adaptability to whichever processing style is
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most accessible given task context. As the vast majority of existing processing style literature has
focused on laboratory induced-mood, the relation between naturally occurring mood states and
information processing style warrants further investigation.
The Effect of Mood State on Cognitive Control
While a substantial amount of literature has examined the influence of pathological levels
of negative affect (e.g., unipolar and bipolar depressive disorders) on cognitive control, less is
understood regarding sub-threshold dimensional effects of negative mood. Although several
studies have shown that NA influences cognitive control processes in the context of affective
stimuli, null findings from a number of studies exploring NA and cognitive control (Blanchette
& Richards, 2010; Mitchell & Phillips, 2007) suggest that NA may have a more limited role in
cognitive control processes than PA. In contrast, PA has been related to increased cognitive
flexibility, creativity, and globally focused processes. High PA has also been related to
impairments in working memory and inhibition of irrelevant information. Relevant empirical
investigations are discussed below.
Martin and Kerns (2010) investigated the effect of positive mood on working memory
and inhibition. In two studies, participants underwent positive or neutral mood induction via
video clips and then completed a task of working memory storage capacity (Running Memory
Span) and prepotent response inhibition (CW-Stroop or Flanker). Results indicated that positive
mood induction resulted in poorer performance on the test of working memory in comparison to
neutral mood induction for both studies. No effect for positive mood induction compared to
neutral was found in either study of inhibitory-related function, suggesting that positive mood
differentially affects cognitive control functions by impairing working memory but having no
effect on inhibitory-related function. However, it should be noted that these inhibitory-related
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findings contrast the findings of Rowe, Hirsh and Anderson (2007), who found that positive
mood was related to impaired performance on a flanker task.
The differential effect of positive mood on specific EFs was also examined by Phillips,
Bull, Adams and Fraser (2002). Subsequent to neutral or happy mood induction, thirty-six
participants completed four conditions of the CW-Stroop task. Compared to neutral mood
induction, positive mood was found to impair performance on the switching condition of the
Stroop test. In a second study, sixty participants underwent neutral or positive mood induction
and then completed three verbal fluency tasks. Positive mood was related to improved
performance on a test of verbal fluency requiring the naming of as many novel uses for a cup as
possible. Significant differences for mood condition were not observed for fluency tasks based
on initial word letter or alternating between semantic category and phonemic criteria. Overall,
results from these studies suggest that positive mood is related to increased fluency requiring
creative responses, but resulted in poorer performance on a task of cognitive flexibility that did
not require creative response suggesting that PA facilitative effects on cognitive flexibility may
depend on level of creativity/engagement in novel processes required to complete demands.
Chepenik, Cornew and Farah (2007) induced and prolonged sad and neutral mood in
thirty-three healthy volunteers across two laboratory sessions. Following mood induction
participants completed seven cognitive tasks. Tasks assessed working memory (Object TwoBack, Digit Span), inhibitory-related function (CW-Stroop, Go/No-Go), and
attention/perception/memory for valenced materials (Attention Probe, Free Recall and
Recognition Memory, Facial Emotional Recognition). Sad mood was found to affect memory for
emotional words and facial emotion recognition, but not performance on other tasks. Sad mood
was found to bias memory toward negatively valenced words relative to neutral mood
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conditions, however overall percentage of word recognition was not affected by mood. Sad
mood was also found to impair facial emotion recognition compared to neutral mood and this
effect was generalized across recognition of neutral, happy and sad faces. Results of this study
indicated that sad mood influences cognitive processes that involve an emotional stimulus, but
not cognitive tasks that do not explicitly involve emotional stimuli.
In another study, 14 student volunteers completed a CWST paradigm across three blocks
of positive, neutral, and negative mood induction (Yuan et al., 2011). Behavioral results did not
differ between mood induction groups regarding response latency or accuracy. The Strooprelated N450 ERP component, which is related to conflict effects emanating from anterior
cingulate cortex and discussed in more detail later, was more pronounced for individuals in the
positive mood induction group but not the negative mood group in comparison to the neutral
mood state. Results of this study suggest increased neural processing was required for the
positive mood induction group to achieve similar behavioral results. Results of this study also
indicate that investigations utilizing only behavioral methodologies may not be adequate to
capture the nuanced effects of mood on cognitive control processes.
Laboratory-induced mood has been related to specific effects in cognitive control
processes engaged during the CW-Stroop task. However, to date no investigations have explored
the dimensional affect of naturally occurring PA on Stroop interference and related neural
response.
Color-Word Stroop Task (CWST)
Recent efforts towards providing an integrative and comprehensive account of cognitive
control have consistently identified inhibitory-related function as a core component of EF
(Banich, 2009; Friedman & Miyake, 2004). Inhibitory-related control processes include the
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ability to suppress irrelevant or interfering information at the sequential levels of processing and
response output. Demands related to everyday life necessitate an ability to control impulses such
as inhibiting prepotent responses or delaying gratification.
Modified versions of the classic CWST (Stroop, 1935; Klein, 1964) have been frequently
utilized to investigate inhibitory-related function. A typical CWST paradigm involves several
task modules, eliciting a number of neural and behavioral response patterns from participants.
Module variations may include: (a) word-reading, reading color-words (e.g., “BLUE” or
“RED”) or non-color words (e.g., “MATH” or “BUN”) in black/grey or color ink; (b) colornaming, naming ink of color swatches or symbol series/non words (e.g., “XXXX” in red); (c)
congruent-word color-naming, naming matched ink color of word, such as the word “RED” in
red ink; (d) incongruent-word color-naming, naming mismatched ink color of word, such as the
word “RED” in blue ink; and (e) switching trials, which instruct participants to switch between
task demands (word-reading or color-naming) in the context of incongruent and congruent
stimuli throughout the condition.
Additionally, color-naming modules may be presented in “blocked” form during which
the entire presentation of stimuli is of the same congruency (e.g., all congruent or all
incongruent), or “mixed” during which the presentation of stimuli alternates between
congruencies (e.g., both congruent and incongruent types are present within same module). One
of the most robust findings of the CWST is commonly referred to as the Stroop interference
effect, described in detail below.
Stroop Interference
Classic CWST paradigms direct participants to focus on one component of a stimulus,
typically ink color, while ignoring other facets of the stimulus, including the written word.
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Computational and mathematical models assert that independent pathways exist for processing
color and word information (Cohen & Servan-Schreiber, 1992; Miller & Cohen, 2001).
Therefore, interference is observed when the task-irrelevant dimension conflicts with the relevant
dimension resulting in different input for each pathway.
As the CWST elicits conflict between more automated response (word-reading) and more
controlled action (color-naming), it requires the engagement of two related inhibitory control
processes in order to produce a correct response. First, interference control reflects the ability to
selectively inhibit the processing of irrelevant information (Nigg, 2000). In the context of the
typical CWST, the irrelevant information is the written word. The other inhibitory-related
function is prepotent response inhibition, which is the ability to modulate dominant or automatic
responses (Friedman & Miyake, 2004). A prepotent response is a reflexive response due to
habituation or the presence of immediate positive/negative reinforcement. In the case of the
CWST, word-reading represents the more habituated/automated response which must be
inhibited in choice of the more controlled action of color-naming.
Within the context of the CWST, interference is observed as an increase in response
latency under incongruent task conditions in comparison to neutral or congruent conditions
(hereafter referred to as Stroop interference – reaction time). In some studies, interference has
also been observed has an increase in relative number of errors under incongruent task conditions
in comparison to neutral or congruent conditions (hereafter referred to as Stroop interference –
accuracy). Participants with typical levels of interference control generally have high accuracy
scores and shorter response times for the congruent trials with somewhat lower accuracy scores
and increased response latency for incongruent trials. Participants with low interference control
generally demonstrate a larger difference in accuracy scores and response latencies between
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congruent and incongruent conditions compared to participants with high interference control
abilities.
Several theories have emerged in efforts to explain the observed behavioral and neural
implications of Stroop interference. Theories of early processing, limited response capacity, and
parallel processing are described below.
Perceptual encoding. The perceptual-encoding perspective provides an early processing
theory of Stroop interference. In comparison to theories placing emphasis on processing after
encoding, theories emphasizing encoding failed to garner significant theoretical popularity or
empirical support (MacLeod, 1991). Broadly, this perspective suggests that the perceptual
encoding speed for information regarding ink-color (e.g., blue) is attenuated due to conflicting
information from an incongruent color word (e.g., “RED”) in comparison to a neutral word (e.g.,
“STEP”). Support of this theory comes from the work of Hock and Egeth (1970). They altered
the CWST to require binary verbal classification of colors (“yes” or “no”) to remove the
semantic relation between responses and stimuli. Interference for incongruent stimuli was still
observed. Hock and Egeth (1970) interpreted these results as suggesting that interference
occurred at the stage of implicit color identification/coding rather than at the stage of overt
response competition. Others have criticized this assumption, indicating that interference at the
level of response is still present despite binary demands (Dalrymple-Alford & Azkoul, 1972;
Dyer, 1973).
Relative speed of processing. This theory posits that Stroop interference occurs due to
the differential speed of processing of relevant (ink color) and irrelevant (word) stimulus
information, that ultimately converges upon a singular response channel that only has room for
one input (Morton & Chambers, 1973). As this theory posits that only one piece of information
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(color or word) may be accepted into the response channel at a time, priority of response is
determined by the speed of processing attributed to the respective information pathway (color or
word). This results in a sort of “attentional bottleneck” to be the first input to reach the response
stage. Typically words have been found to be read faster than colors are named (Cattell, 1886;
Fraisse, 1969), therefore this theory suggests that Stroop interference occurs when irrelevant
stimuli information (word) reaches the response output stage before slower relevant information
(ink color) resulting in conflict in selecting the correct color response (MacLeod, 1991).
Evidence against a basic speed-of-processing account comes from studies in which the color and
word components of the Stroop stimulus were presented with varying stimulus onset
asynchronies (SOAs; Dyer, 1971; Glaser & Glaser, 1982; Sugg & McDonald, 1994). If
interference in the CW-Stroop task is primarily due to word meaning being processed more
quickly than ink color, classic interference should be eliminated if color information is presented
sufficiently before a word resulting in reverse Stroop interference/facilitation. To date, this
pattern of results is not typical within SOA empirical efforts suggesting that a speed of
processing account does not sufficiently explain Stroop interference (MacLead 1991; Maclead
2015).
Continuum of automaticity. Similar to the speed of processing theory, an automaticity
theory of Stroop interference is defined by the parallel processing of multiple stimuli
characteristics that ultimately bottleneck at the stage of response, as these theories suggest only
one stream of processing may be inputted into the response selection stage at any given moment.
This theory differs slightly from the speed of processing theory by emphasizing degree of
information automaticity and related recruitment of attentional/processing resources (LaBerge &
Samuels, 1974; Posner & Synder, 1975). While purely automatic processes are defined as
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operating outside the realm of volitional attention, other processes can develop strong
automaticity through learning/practice. Processes with high levels of automaticity are believed to
interfere with less automatic processes (MacLeod & Dunbar, 1988). Kahneman and Chajczyk
(1983) categorize Stroop interference as an example of partially automatic forces (word reading)
at odds with less automatic forces (color naming). According to this theory, Stroop interference
occurs because the level of automaticity is stronger for word reading than color naming, thus
naming ink color recruits more heavily from attentional resources than reading, ultimately
increasing response latency when ink color and written word are incongruent. Within this
context, word reading is often viewed as obligatory (given its large level of automaticity), while
color naming remains optional requiring top-down attentional control to engage more effortful
processing.
Parallel distributed processing model. Expanding upon the work of Logan (1980),
Cohen, Dunbar and McClelland (1990) put forth one of the most comprehensive models of
Stroop interference to date. The Parallel Distributed Processing Model includes many of the
strengths established in speed of processing and automaticity theories while exchanging the
limited serial stage approach for a more inclusive system loop. Emphasis within this model is
placed on pathway strength and not relative speed. Level of automaticity is determined as a
function of the strength of each pathway and pathways are strengthened through practice.
Pathways necessitating fewer processing resources are stronger at lower levels of engagement
compared to those less automated pathways. The volitional direction of cognitive resources can
increase pathway strength. Therefore, the likelihood and degree of interference occurring is
determined by the relative strengths and information processing capacities of each engaged
pathway (MacLeod, 1991). In the context of the CWST, the engaged pathways would be color
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and word information. This theory refutes the limited-capacity of a singular response channel
(assumed in both speed of processing and automaticity theories) and instead suggests that there
can be as many response channels as there are responses. Whichever response channel is most
strongly activated will ultimately produce the response.
Neural Correlates of Stroop Interference
Empirical evidence from a number of electrophysiological and functional imaging studies
indicate involvement of several regions of the brain during interference control, including the
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), posterior parietal
cortex, and inferior parietal cortex (Egner, Delano & Hirsch, 2007; MacLeod and MacDonald
2000; Peterson et al. 2002; Silton et al., 2010; Van Veen & Carter, 2005). ERP studies provide
the temporal sensitivity necessary to identify the rapid succession of events related to
interference processing. While several ERP components have been associated with Stroop
interference, variable findings suggest that the time course of neural processes engaged during
Stroop interference remains an open question.
ERPs indicate how the brain responds to a specific event. ERP waveforms are typically
described in terms of latency, amplitude, and scalp distribution and are generally calculated
using the averages of numerous trials. Latency refers to the temporal onset of the ERP in relation
to the event it is “locked” to (e.g., stimulus onset or response). Amplitude reflects the difference
in voltage between a given electrode site (or collapsed grouping of sites) and the assigned
reference point. Amplitudes can be positive inflections or negative deflections within the EEG
waveform. Standard nomenclature for ERPs often reflect both amplitude and latency
characteristics, typically beginning with a “P” for positive inflections and “N” for negative
deflections followed by numbers to indicate general latency. ERP amplitudes are typically
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measured/reported in microvolts (µV). Common methods to calculate amplitudes include
instantaneous (amplitude at a single latency), peak (the most positive or most negative point
within a specified time window), and mean amplitude (averaged voltage within a specified time
window) (Luck, 2012; Sur & Sinha, 2009; Woodman, 2010). Associations between neural
correlates (ERP latencies and amplitudes) and neural processes must consider how contextual
factors influence these variables (Luck, 2012; Sur & Sinha, 2009). Previous literature
investigating the time course of the CWST has analyzed various ERPs including the N200, P300,
N450 and a late slow wave component discussed below in order of temporal onset.
N200. The N200 is a negative deflection that peaks approximately 200 to 250 ms
following the stimulus presentation. The N200 encompasses a family of neural responses that
differ based upon eliciting context, such as stimulus modality (Ceponien, Rinne & Naatanen,
2002; Donchin, Ritter & McCallum, 1978; Sur & Sinha, 2009). Subcomponents within the N200
wave include N200a/Mismatch negativity (N200a/MMN), N200b, and N200c. MMN is elicited
subsequent to an infrequent change in repetitive stimuli in any sensory modality, but has been
most frequently studied utilizing auditory paradigms and has a frontocentral distribution
(Naatanen, Paavilainen, Rinne & Alho, 2007; Pazo-Alvarez, Cadaveira & Amenedo, 2003). The
N200b, also located frontocentrally, occurs slightly later than the N200a following a taskrelevant change in the stimulus characteristic (Pritchard, Shappell & Brandt, 1991; Folstein &
Petten, 2007). The N200b has been related to the detection of perceptual novelty, response
conflict, error monitoring, and inhibiting a prepotent response system (Folstein & Petten, 2007).
The N200c presents as posterior maximal for visual stimuli and is elicited when the classification
of disparate stimuli is required, as in identifying targets from non-targets (Pritchard, Shappell &
Brandt, 1991; Folstein & Petten, 2007). The N200 wave has been observed in CWST paradigms
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(Holmes and Pizzagalli, 2008; Silton et al, 2010) as well as in other visual interference and
conflict monitoring tasks (Folstein & Petten, 2007; Kopp, Rist & Mattler, 1996; Yeung,
Botvinick & Cohen, 2004). Relevant to the CWST, the N200b has differentiated between
congruencies, with greater amplitudes for incongruent than congruent conditions.
P300 (P3). The P3 is often considered an index of cognitive control and has been
implicated in several CWST studies (e.g., Badzakova-Trajkov, Barnett, Waldie, & Kirk 2009;
Duncan-Johnson & Kopell, 1981; Ilan & Polich, 1999). The P300 is a positive inflection peaking
approximately 300 ms following stimulus onset and was first reported over 50 years ago (Sutton
et al., 1965). The P300 has been broadly regarded as a marker of task-relevant stimulus
processing/stimulus evaluation and is further subdivided into the P3a and P3b subcomponents
(Polich, 2007). The P3b is regarded as the “traditional” P300 and is observed to have maximum
amplitude in parietal regions and it is typically elicited in tasks with two types of stimuli of
unequal probability, with larger P3b amplitude observed for the infrequent stimuli type (Polich,
2007).
In contrast, the P3a evidences a fronto-central distribution and is related to distracter
information, such as the written word in the context color-naming demands (Polich, 2007). The
N200b is consistently observed in combination with the P3a, a subcomponent of the P300.
Several studies have found that the P3a amplitude elicited by incongruent stimuli is smaller than
that elicited by congruent stimuli (Houston et al., 2004; Ilan & Polich, 1999). BadzakovaTrajkov, Barnett, Waldie, and Kirk (2009) found no discernible difference between congruent
and incongruent conditions at P3, but both elicited larger P3 than neutral conditions at central
and parietal sites. Other studies have also found no difference between congruent and
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incongruent conditions regarding P3b amplitude (Hanslymayr et al., 2008; Liotti et al., 2000;
Markela-Lerenc et al., 2004).
N450. The N450 is one of the most commonly identified ERP components associated
with the CWST. Distinguishable as a negative-going deflection 300-500ms following stimulus
onset with fronto-central topography, The N450 ERP waveform typically peaks around 450ms
following the presentation of a stimulus with high levels of conflict (Liotti et al., 2000; van Veen
& Carter, 2002; West & Alain, 1999). Results regarding the N450 are robust, with studies
consistently reporting that incongruent conditions elicit increased amplitude relative to congruent
or neutral conditions (West, 2003; West, Jakubek, Wymbs, Perry & Moore, 2005). ERP source
localization efforts have consistently found that diploes placed within the ACC account for the
most variance in the topography of the N450 (Liotti, Woldorff, Perez & Mayberg, 2000; Szucs,
Soltesz & White, 2009; Hanslmayr et al., 2008). Further, evidence accrued from functional
magnetic resonance imaging studies (fMRI) have implicated increased ACC activity in response
to incongruent compared to congruent stimuli, consistent with a role in conflict processing
(MacDonald et al., 2000). While some studies have argued that the N450 denotes the resolution
of conflicting information (Liotti et al., 2000), others regard it as marking the detection of
conflict (Hanslmayr et al., 2008). Seeking to clarify this discrepancy, Szucs and Soltesz (2012)
utilized electro-myography (EMG) in conjunction with ERP to determine whether the N450 is
related to stimulus or response conflict processing. Despite manipulating level of response
conflict on a trial-by-trial basis (as confirmed by EMG recording), N450 effect remained stable
suggesting that N450 is best conceptualized as a marker of stimulus conflict rather than response
conflict.
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Late activity (Conflict SP). Several studies have identified a conflict-sensitive slow
potential (sometimes referred to as the Conflict SP) characterized by a sustained parietal
positivity and lateral frontal negativity beginning around 500ms post stimulus onset. The
Conflict SP has been found to be more positive following incongruent than congruent trials over
temporo-parietal sites (Liotti, Woldorff, Perez III, and Mayberg (2000) and more negative in the
same comparison at fronto-central sites (Hanslmayr et al, 2008). Liotti and colleagues (2000)
referred to this later waveform as the Late Positive Complex (LPC) and suggested that this later
activity may be related to additional processing of word meaning. Hanslmayr and colleagues
(2008) offered a different perspective, referring to the component as the Late Negativity (LN);
they suggested that the sustained activity likely reflected additional recruitment/engagement of
cognitive control mechanisms necessary to select proper response in the context of interference.
This interpretation is similar to one offered by West and colleagues (2005) who found that
Conflict SP was correlated with overall RT and accuracy, thus suggesting that it may be more
reflective of response selection. Additional research is needed to better characterize the time
course, topography and functional implications of this late ERP complex that has been repeatedly
observed in the context of the CWST.
Overall, the N450 remains the most reliable ERP marker of congruency effects in the
CWST. While not as consistently addressed in CWST literature as N450, N200 has been related
to the detection of response conflict and prepotent response inhibition in visual interference and
conflict monitoring tasks. Findings remain mixed regarding processes indexed by P3 and
localization of later sustained slow wave activity in the context of Stroop interference.. As prior
research has not addressed the influence of naturally occurring PA on the recruitment/allocation
of neural resources during interference processing, the present study will investigate the
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influence of PA on the two most established ERP components related to interference processing,
N450 and N200.
Research Overview: Aims & Hypotheses
The present study investigated the relationship between naturally occurring positive
mood state (PA) and interference processing during the Color-Word Stroop Task. This study
proposed that neural resources are differentially recruited and allocated dependent on taskrelated demands (presence or absence of interference) and that implementation of these resources
are influenced by levels of positive affect.
Aim 1
This study investigated the behavioral and neural mechanisms of interference processing
during a modified CWST. Previous investigations utilizing ERPs have resulted in mixed
findings; therefore the first aim of the present study was to establish the time course and pattern
of activation of the most reliable ERP components related to interference processing (N200 and
N450) for different stimulus presentations (blocked and mixed) within this specific version of the
CW-Stroop task.
Hypothesis 1a (reaction time). A behavioral cost of interference is reflected in increased
response latency (reaction time; RT) for incongruent compared to congruent conditions for both
blocked and mixed presentations.
Hypothesis 1b (accuracy). A behavioral cost of interference is reflected in decreased
accuracy (increased number of errors) for incongruent compared to congruent conditions for both
blocked and mixed presentations.
Hypothesis 2a (N200 amplitude) Presence of interference elicits increased negativity at
fronto-central electrode sites occurring approximately 200 – 300 ms post stimulus-onset (N200)
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in incongruent compared to congruent conditions. This has been suggested to reflect the
detection of response conflict and prepotent response inhibition.
Hypothesis 2b (N200 latency) Presence of interference results in delayed peak latency of
a negative component occurring approximately 200 – 300ms post stimulus-onset (N200) in
incongruent compared to congruent trials.
Hypothesis 3a (N450 Amplitude). Presence of interference elicits increased negativity at
fronto-central electrode sites occurring approximately 350-500ms post stimulus-onset (N450) in
incongruent compared to congruent conditions. This has been suggested to reflect the detection
of interference and recruitment of central executive processing resources rather than the classical
semantic incongruency effect (Hanslmayr et al., 2008).
Hypothesis 3b (N450 Latency). Presence of interference results in delayed peak latency
of a negative component occurring approximately 350-500ms post stimulus-onset (N450) in
incongruent compared to congruent trials.
Aim 2
This study examined the associations between self-reported positive naturalistic state
affect (PA) and performance on a modified CWST. Behavioral (RT and accuracy) and ERP
(N200 and N450) indices of performance are analyzed. High Positive Affect (PA) is predicted to
have a deleterious effect on CW-Stroop interference processing. As individuals with remitted
depression were included, analyses also accounted for variance associated with diagnostic
history.
Hypothesis 1a (Reaction Time). Based on previous mood induction findings, Stroop
interference – RT is higher for individuals with Higher PA and lower for individuals with Lower
PA for both blocked and mixed presentations.
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Hypothesis 1b (Accuracy). Based on previous mood induction findings, increased
Stroop interference – accuracy is associated with Higher PA for both blocked and mixed
presentations.
Hypothesis 2a (N200 Amplitude) Higher levels of PA is related to increased N200
amplitude on incongruent trials as individuals with high PA will require increased neural
resources to detect response conflict ad inhibit irrelevant information for both blocked and mixed
presentations.
Hypothesis 2b (N200 Latency) Higher levels of PA is related to increased N200 latency
as individuals with high PA will have slower response time and slower recruitment of neural
resources necessary to complete trials with interference (incongruent stimuli) for both blocked
and mixed presentations.
Hypothesis 3a (N450 Amplitude). Higher levels of PA is related to increased N450
amplitude on incongruent trials as individuals with high PA will require increased neural
resources to inhibit irrelevant information in order to process conflicting information for both
blocked and mixed presentations.
Hypothesis 3b (N450 Latency). Higher levels of PA is related to increased N450 latency
since individuals with high PA will have slower response time and slower recruitment of neural
resources necessary to complete trials with interference (incongruent stimuli).
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CHAPTER THREE
METHODS
Study Overview
The present research study was a component of a larger research study. After participants
were deemed eligible for inclusion in the broader research study, they were invited for three
laboratory visits during which they completed informed consent, a semi-structured clinical
interview, self-report measures, and behavioral tasks while electroencephalography (EEG) data
were recorded. The university Institutional Review Board approved all recruiting and
experimental methods.
Participants
Participants in this study were native English-speaking undergraduate students from an
urban, Midwestern university. Participants were recruited from a participant-pool based registry
maintained by a university research laboratory.
Participants were excluded from the study if they endorsed any of the following
exclusion criteria, which are known to influence EEG recording: 1) colorblindness, 2)
neurological medical condition, 3) a sensory impairment (i.e., colorblindness) that would
influence study procedures, 4) regular substance use, and 5) left handedness. Participants
reporting past and/or current psychiatric treatment (medication or psychotherapy) were included
in the study.
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History and current status of depression was determined through diagnostic interview
(Mini-International Neuropsychiatric Interview, MINI; Sheehan et al., 1998) that was based on
criteria determined by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, 4th edition revised (DSM-IV-TR;
American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Participants included in the present study either met
DSM-IV-TR criteria for a lifetime history of depression but did not meet criteria for current
depression (remitted depressed group) or never met DSM-IV-TR criteria for depression (control
group). Individuals who met current diagnostic criteria for depression were excluded from the
present study.
Participants (N = 49) were paid $15 per hour for their participation. Two participants
were eliminated from further analysis for the Color-Word Stroop Task due to poor task
performance (i.e., <50% accuracy on the mixed incongruent condition); eight participants were
excluded from analyses due to low-quality EEG signal (e.g., number of rejected trials during
cleaning, electrical noise).
The final sample included 39 participants with behavioral and EEG data on the ColorWord Stroop (37 with PANAS data). Of these 39 participants, 20 participants did not have a
lifetime history of depression and were categorized as controls (age M = 19.75, SD = 1.80, range
= 18-24; 55% female; 62.7% White, 27.3% Asian American, 10% Hispanic/Latino). 19
participants presented with a history of depression without meeting criteria for current depression
and were categorized as remitted depressed (age M = 19.53, SD = 1.10, range = 18-22; 79%
female; 68% White, 32% Asian American, 0% Hispanic/Latino).
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Procedure
Demographic information. Participants reported information regarding age, gender,
handedness, and ethnicity collected online via survey software utilizing a tablet device in the
research laboratory.
Diagnostic evaluation/screening. Participants completed a diagnostic interview using
the MINI International Neuropsychiatric Interview (MINI; Sheehan, et al., 1998). In the present
study, the MINI was used to assess for current presentation and history of major depressive
episodes. Interviewers were master-level students who were trained and supervised by Rebecca
Silton, Ph.D. Accuracy of diagnosis was reviewed in consensus meetings in order to ensure
consensus regarding diagnosis.
Depression severity. To evaluate current depression severity, the nine-item Patient
Health Questionnaire (PHQ-9; Kroenke et al., 2001) was administered. PHQ-9 items are scored
from “0” (not at all) to “3” (nearly every day) and are based on the depression criteria from the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition.
State affect. Participants completed the Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS;
Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) before completion of behavioral/EEG measures. The PANAS
is a 20-item scale that measures the distinct constructs of positive and negative affect.
Participants answer on a five-point Likert scale how accurately words describe their current
mood. For example, negative affect words include "afraid, nervous, and guilty" and positive
affect words include "active, enthusiastic, and interested." The PANAS yields Positive Affect
(PA) and Negative Affect (NA) subscales. In the present study, the internal consistencies of the
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PA (α = .86) and NA scales (α = .88) were adequate and commensurate with past studies (i.e.,
Crawford & Henry, 2004; Mehrabian, 1998; Roesch, 1998).
Behavioral tasks and EEG measurement. Participants completed two cognitive tasks
while electroencephalography (EEG) data was recorded. Only behavioral and EEG data from the
modified Color-Word Stroop task were included in the present study. Participants were seated
100 cm from a 21-inch CRT monitor in a quiet, noise-shielded room. The stimuli were presented
and responses recorded using E-Prime 2.0 (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002).
Apparatus and physiological recording. EEG data were recorded from each participant
using a Biosemi Active2 EEG system. Custom-designed Falk Minow caps with 64 equidistant
Ag/AgCl active electrodes were used for data collection. Common Mode Sense (CMS) and
Driven Right Leg (DRL) sensors were placed near the vertex and formed a feedback loop
serving the job of typical “ground” electrodes. Two electrodes were placed on the mastoid bones.
Two electrodes were placed on the outer canthus of each eye to monitor horizontal eye
movements (HEOG). Two additional electrodes were placed on the inferior edge of the orbit of
each eye to monitor vertical eye movements (VEOG). After placement of the electrode cap,
electrode positions were digitized. Data were recorded with a band pass filter of 0 –104 Hz, and
sampled at a rate of 512 Hz
Stroop interference. To assess interference processing, participants completed an
electronic Color-Word Stroop task, based upon the Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System (DKEFS) Color-Word Interference Task (Delis, Kaplan, & Kramer, 2001). Interference occurs
when conflicting stimuli are presented simultaneously. In the case of the Color-Word Stroop
task, conflicting stimuli are presented such that the name of one color (e.g., the word “RED”) is
printed in the ink of another color (e.g., blue). These task trials are referred to as incongruent
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trials. Interference does not occur when stimuli characteristics are in agreement (e.g., the word
“RED” is printed in red ink). Trials in which the word name and ink color match are referred to
as congruent trials. To obtain an index of accuracy interference, accuracy on incongruent trials
was subtracted from accuracy on congruent trials. To obtain an index of reaction time
interference, reaction time on congruent trials was subtracted from reaction time on incongruent
trials.
Task design. Stimulus presentation times were based upon previous Stroop tasks
optimized for EEG recording (Compton et al., 2011; Lansbergen & Kenemans, 2008; Silton et
al., 2010). Each trial began with a fixation cross in the center of the screen, the presentation of
which varied between 500-1100 ms to minimize potential habituation to the stimuli presentation
format. The stimulus was then be presented for 150 ms, followed by a blank screen, during
which participants had 1500 ms to respond before the onset of the next trial. On each trial,
participants indicated their response (blue, green, red, or yellow) via a button press. The four
response options were mapped onto a response box with color-coded keys.
Participants completed the following task blocks: (a) word-reading congruent (b) wordreading incongruent, (c) color-naming congruent block, (d) color-naming-incongruent block, (d)
color-naming mixed congruent and incongruent block, and (e) task-switching. Participants were
provided 90-second breaks in between each test block. The color-naming blocked and mixed
conditions for congruent and incongruent stimuli were analyzed for the present study; these
blocks are further detailed below.
Prior to beginning the Color-Word Stroop task, participants completed color
identification practice (16 trials) with written feedback (“correct” or “incorrect”) displayed on
the screen after each trial. Sixteen practice trials with accuracy feedback preceded each of the
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task blocks; twenty-four practice trials preceded the switching trials. Feedback was not provided
throughout the testing blocks of trials.
Blocked color-naming condition. Participants completed a congruent and incongruent
condition of color-identification of words. The congruent condition only presented congruent
stimuli (e.g., the word “RED” printed in red ink), and the incongruent condition only presented
incongruent stimuli (e.g., the word “RED” printed in blue ink). Each condition was presented in
two consecutive sets of 48 trials with a 10 second break in between (96 total
congruent/incongruent total trials were presented).
Mixed color-naming condition. Participants completed one mixed presentation of coloridentification (see Figure 1). For the mixed condition, the incongruent and congruent stimuli
were randomly intermixed throughout each presentation. This condition was divided into four
consecutive sets of 48 trials, with a ten second break in between each set, totaling 96 congruent
and 96 incongruent trials.
Figure 1. Schematic of Color-Word Stroop Mixed Color-Naming Block

Note. Color-Word Stroop mixed color-naming blocks included 96 congruent and 96 incongruent
intermixed trials that were randomized within each block. The block was presented in sets of 48
trials, with a ten second break between each trial.
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EEG data reduction. EEG data processing was performed in Brain Electrical Source
Analysis software (BESA, Version 6.0). Following the adaptive artifact correction method (Ille,
Berg, Scherg, 2002) ocular artifacts were corrected using a spatial PCA filter. Muscle and other
artifact were removed through automated and visual inspection of raw data. Participants with
fewer than 30% rejected trials across conditions were included in ERP analyses. Baseline
adjustment was computed using the averaged amplitude of 100 ms pre-stimulus onset. Data were
referenced using an average reference and were not digitally filtered for analyses.
Stimulus-locked averages were calculated to ascertain mean amplitudes and peak
latencies for central N200 and N450 components across conditions. On average, participants had
77 accepted correct “blocked congruent” trials, 75 accepted correct “blocked incongruent” trials,
73 “mixed congruent” trials, and 66 “mixed incongruent” trials.
Electrode selection and temporal windows were informed by visual inspection of data as
well as a priori judgments based on findings from previous studies investigating these ERP
components in similar contexts (i.e., Silton et al., 2010). The N200 component was measured
from 225 to 325 ms post stimulus onset for correct trials of the CW-Stroop Task. The N450 was
measured from 350 to 500 ms post stimulus onset for correct trials of the CW-Stroop Task. A
cluster of seven central electrodes was identified for N200 and N450 analyses (Figure 2).
Amplitude and peak latency data for stimulus-locked averages were calculated for the
aforementioned N200 and N450 time windows.
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Figure 6. Electrode localization for frontocentral N200/P300 and parietal P300 ERPs
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Figure 2. Electrode Localization for N200 and N450 ERP Analyses.

(b)

(a)

(a) Frontocentral N200/P300 electrode cluster. (b) Parietal P300 electrode cluster.
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CHAPTER FOUR
RESULTS
Descriptive Analyses
Skewness analyses were conducted for all variables using guidelines established by
Tabachnick and Fidell (2001). Conservative alpha levels (.001) were employed to evaluate the
significance of skewness, in which z-score values greater than 2.00 were considered significantly
skewed. Since no variables were skewed, data were analyzed without transformation. The means
and standard deviations for study variables are presented in Table 1. Two-tailed t-tests were
calculated to assess whether the healthy control and remitted depressed groups differed on affect
and depression severity. Results did not indicate significant group differences. ERP waveforms
are presented in Figure 3 and Figure 4.

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Study Variables
Diagnostic Group
Healthy Controls

Remitted Depressed

M

SD

M

SD

PANAS - PA

29.00

5.98

27.22

6.54

PANAS - NA

15.33

5.86

15.56

5.94

PHQ-9

4.76

4.27

6.81

4.40

Self-Report Measure

39

40
Congruent Trials – Blocked Condition

M

SD

M

SD

0.95

0.04

0.95

0.02

395.92

100.22

383.32

99.10

0.58

1.99

-0.27

1.37

264.16

17.24

273.87

21.82

2.84

2.34

1.89

1.89

403.16

32.50

411.96

36.14

M

SD

M

SD

0.92

0.06

0.91

0.04

Response Time

542.77

125.76

523.71

131.45

N200 Amplitude

0.73

1.94

-0.37

1.35

268.99

14.72

280.32

20.16

2.28

2.00

0.94

1.91

415.63

36.74

424.98

32.09

M

SD

M

SD

0.96

0.04

.96

0.03

Response Time

434.43

88.18

434.60

122.95

N200 Amplitude

0.45

2.27

-0.87

1.59

266.75

18.34

274.62

18.98

2.18

2.00

.88

1.86

413.77

39.86

402.12

33.15

M

SD

M

SD

Accuracy
Response Time (ms)
N200 Amplitude
N200 Latency (ms)
N450 Amplitude
N450 Latency (ms)

Incongruent Trials – Blocked
Condition
Accuracy

N200 Latency
N450 Amplitude
N450 Latency

Congruent Trials - Mixed Condition
Accuracy

N200 Latency
N450 Amplitude
N450 Latency

Incongruent Trials - Mixed Condition

33

41
0.90

0.07

0.87

0.06

Response Time

575.75

126.40

571.09

131.95

N200 Amplitude

0.46

2.24

-0.42

1.41

271.44

16.28

278.77

18.42

1.97

2.25

1.04

2.23

402.93

33.32

424.99

38.18

Stroop Interference – Blocked
Condition

M

SD

M

SD

Accuracy (Con Acc – Inc Acc)

0.03

0.04

0.03

0.04

146.85

62.14

139.39

85.26

M

SD

M

SD

0.06

0.06

0.09

0.07

141.32

65.77

136.49

60.66

Accuracy

N200 Latency
N450 Amplitude
N450 Latency

Reaction Time (Inc RT – Con RT)

Stroop Interference – Mixed Condition
Accuracy (Con Acc – Inc Acc)
Reaction Time (Inc RT – Con RT)

Figure 3. ERP Waveforms at Cz for Blocked Conditions

―HC Congruent
―RD Congruent
―HC Incongruent
―RD Incongruent

Amplitude (µV)

+1

200

400

600

-1

33

800ms

42
Figure 4. ERP Waveform at Cz for Mixed Conditions
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Correlational Analyses
Correlational analyses were conducted for each diagnostic group (healthy control or
remitted depressed) to assess the relations among relevant study variables. Findings are
presented in Table 2 and Table 3. Significant correlations involving primary study constructs are
characterized below.
Affect and Behavioral/ERP Correlations
Higher levels of self-reported positive affect (PA) were related to faster onset of N200
latency during mixed congruent trials for the healthy control group (r = -.52), but later onset
N200 for the same condition for the remitted depressed group (r = .47). Similarly, higher levels
of self-reported negative affect (NA) were related to attenuated N200 amplitude for mixed
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congruent trials for the healthy control group, but larger N200 amplitude during the same
condition for the remitted depressed group.
Blocked Condition Behavioral and ERP Correlations
For the healthy control group, correlations between behavioral performance and neural
correlates showed an association between Stroop interference reaction time (Stroop interferenceRT, incongruent trials reaction time – congruent trials reaction time) and N450 latency for
incongruent blocked trials (r = -.52); higher levels of Stroop interference conflict were related to
faster onset of N450 latency for incongruent blocked trials. Stroop interference-RT was related to
N450 amplitude, such that higher levels of interference correlated with increased N450
amplitude during incongruent blocked trials.
Stroop interference accuracy (congruent accuracy – incongruent accuracy) for blocked
trials directly correlated with Stroop interference accuracy for mixed trials for both the healthy
control group (r = .74) and the remitted depressed group (r = .52). Increased Stroop interference
accuracy during the blocked presentation of conditions was also related to increased N200
amplitude during blocked incongruent (r = -.49) and congruent conditions (r = -.46) for healthy
controls. Increased Stroop interference accuracy during the blocked condition correlated with
delayed onset of N200 (r = -.51) and more negative N450 amplitude (r = -.56) during blocked
incongruent trials for the remitted depressed group.
Mixed Condition Behavioral and ERP Correlations
Lastly, for healthy controls, Stroop interference accuracy during the mixed condition was
related to more negative N200 amplitudes for mixed congruent (r = -.56) and incongruent (r = .55) conditions.
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Table 2. Pearson Correlations for the Healthy Control Group
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1. PA

--

2. NA

-.14

--

3. PHQ-9

.07

.22

--

4. Block Interference-RT

.31

-.16

.04

--

5. Mix Interference-RT

-.21

-.14

.12

-.03

--

6. Block Interference-Acc

-.02

-.15

-.09

.06

-.18

--

7. Mix Interference-Acc

-.05

-.21

.05

.05

.10

.74*

--

8. N200 BC Amplitude

-.07

.42

.02

.08

.11

-.46*

-.57*

9. N200 BC Latency

-.25

.23

.30

-.27

.23

.39

.52*

10. N200 BI Amplitude

-.19

.56*

.12

.13

-.06

-.49*

-.49*

11. N200 BI Latency

.37

.22

-.03

.04

.07

.27

.31

12. N200 MC Amplitude

-.13

.57*

.16

.15

-.14

-.41

-.56*

13. N200 MC Latency

.52*

.31

-.36

-.13

.22

.01

.23

14. N200 MI Amplitude

-.15

.46

.09

.22

-.10

-.53*

-.55*

15. N200 MI Latency

-.09

.00

-.16

.14

-.02

.32

.42

16. N450 BC Amplitude

.16

.06

-.22

.15

-.03

-.19

-.11

17. N450 BC Latency

-.18

-.16

-.14

-.20

.28

-.03

-.14

18. N450 BI Amplitude

.05

.13

-.10

.10

.09

-.29

-.16

19. N450 BI Latency

-.23

.20

.14

-.52*

-.08

.30

.09

20. N450 MC Amplitude

.14

.25

-.06

.10

-.16

-.18

-.27

21. N450 MC Latency

-.41

.34

-.19

-.36

.18

.33

.08

22. N450 MI Amplitude

-.01

.19

.03

.24

.12

-.34

-.35

23. N450 MI Latency

-.37

.06

-.22

-.51*

.03

.31

.30

Notes. PA = positive affect; NA = negative affect; RT = reaction time; Acc = accuracy; BC = blocked congruent; BI
= blocked incongruent; MC = mixed congruent; MI = mixed incongruent; * = p < 0.05
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Table 3. Pearson Correlations for the Remitted Depressed Group
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1. PA

--

2. NA

.33

--

3. PHQ-9

.15

.72*

--

4. Block Interference-RT

-.25

-.30

-.07

--

5. Mix Interference-RT

-.35

-.20

.02

.44

--

6. Block Interference-Acc

-.29

-.09

.03

.17

-.21

--

7. Mix Interference-Acc

-.27

-.30

-.24

.26

.46*

.51*

--

8. N200 BC Amplitude

.07

-.61*

-.63*

-.39

-.34

.06

.13

9. N200 BC Latency

.40

.18

-.49

-.09

-.06

.09

.31

10. N200 BI Amplitude

.27

-.10

-.42

-.25

-.21

-.40

-.10

11. N200 BI Latency

.37

.06

-.25

.01

-.40

.51*

.23

12. N200 MC Amplitude

-.28

-.54*

-.73*

-.15

-.10

-.01

.18

13. N200 MC Latency

.47*

.04

-.26

.02

.01

.03

.22

14. N200 MI Amplitude

-.28

-.32

-.36

-.23

-.13

-.17

-.09

15. N200 MI Latency

.46

.00

-.35

.00

-.06

.18

.26

16. N450 BC Amplitude

-.15

-.19

.40

-.28

-.12

-.01

-.17

17. N450 BC Latency

-.02

-.18

-.27

-.13

-.24

-.29

-.30

18. N450 BI Amplitude

.05

.04

.18

-.50*

-.08

-.56*

-.43

19. N450 BI Latency

.13

.14

.40

.07

.08

.00

.19

-.52*

-.29

-.21

-.20

-.11

.03

-.16

21. N450 MC Latency

.10

.25

.00

.04

-.10

-.40

-.27

22. N450 MI Amplitude

-.44

-.22

.03

-.39

-.03

-.14

-.19

23. N450 MI Latency

.39

.22

.21

-.20

-.13

.00

-.07

20. N450 MC Amplitude

Notes. PA = positive affect; NA = negative affect; RT = reaction time; Acc = accuracy; BC = blocked congruent; BI
= blocked incongruent; MC = mixed congruent; MI = mixed incongruent; * = p < 0.05
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Hypothesis Testing
Aim 1 (Stroop Interference)
A series of repeated measures ANOVA analyses were conducted to evaluate Aim 1
regarding behavioral and neural correlates of Stroop Interference effects for healthy controls and
individuals with remitted depression. Behavioral data (i.e., response time or response accuracy)
and event related potential (ERP) components (i.e., N200/N450 ERP amplitudes and latencies)
were within-subject variables using a 2x2 design of condition (blocked or mixed) and
congruency (congruent or incongruent). For all analyses, diagnostic group (healthy controls or
remitted depressed) was entered as a between-subject factor. Wilks’ lambda statistics are
reported for all multivariate analyses unless analyses rejected the null hypotheses for
homogeneity of variance/covariance across diagnostic groups, Pillai’s Trace was conducted to
account for violation in statistical assumptions.
A power analysis with a significance level of p <.05 (Aiken & West, 1991; Cohen, 1992)
was conducted using G*Power version 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, Buchner, 2007) to estimate
the sample size needed to detect within subject differences between conditions and congruency
and between-subject differences for lifetime history of depression. A review of literature
regarding remitted depression and cognition indicated power for a medium effect size
(Hasselbalch, Knorr & Vedel Kessing, 2011), but how this specifically translates to different
components of cognitive control is unclear. The power analysis indicated that a sample of N = 44
participants would be needed to detect a large effect size. A sample of N = 220 would be need to
detect a medium effect size. As such the following results are discussed in the context of limited
power.
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Hypothesis 1a (reaction time). Hypothesis 1a predicted that a behavioral cost of
interference would be observed via increased reaction time (RT) for incongruent compared to
congruent trials. A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to compare the main effects of
block condition, congruency, and diagnostic group and the interaction effects between these
variables on RT. As hypothesized, a main effect was found for congruency, F (1, 37) = 266.90, p
< .01, ηp2 = .89, with larger RT observed on incongruent trials (M = 553.33, SE = 19.18)
compared to congruent trials (M = 412.32, SE = 16.02) confirming the impact of interference
processing on RT (see Figure 5). A main effect was also found for block condition (see Figure
6), F (1, 37) = 17.60, p < .01, ηp2 = .32, in that RT was longer for mixed trials (M = 503.97, SE =
18.27) in comparison to blocked trials (M = 461.68, SE = 17.44). Diagnostic group and
interaction factors between variables were not significant (p’s >.05).
Figure 5. Main Effect of Congruency on Reaction Time
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Figure 6. Main Effect of Block Condition on Reaction Time

Hypothesis 1b (accuracy). Hypothesis 1b predicted that a behavioral cost of interference
would be observed in decreased accuracy for incongruent compared to congruent trials. A
repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to compare the main effects of block condition,
congruency, and diagnostic group and the interaction effects between these variables on
accuracy. As hypothesized, a main effect was found for congruency, F (1, 37) = 51.97, p < .01,
ηp2 = .58, with decreased accuracy observed on incongruent trials (M = .90, SE = .01) compared
to congruent trials (M = .95, SE = .01) confirming the impact of interference processing on task
accuracy (see Figure 7). Similar to findings regarding RT, a main effect was also found for block
condition (see Figure 8), F (1, 37) = 4.64, p < .05, ηp2 = .11. Accuracy was lower on mixed trials
(M = .92, SE = .01) in comparison to blocked trials (M = .93, SE = .01).
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Figure 7. Main Effect of Congruency on Accuracy

Figure 8. Main Effect of Block Condition on Accuracy

Additionally, a significant interaction for block condition by congruency was observed, F
(1, 37) = 30.66, p < .01, ηp2 = .45. Holm’s sequential Bonferroni post-hoc analyses revealed
simple main effects for congruency during the blocked condition, F (1, 38) = 26.09, p < .001, ηp2
= .41, and mixed condition, F (1, 38) = 52.74, p < .01, ηp2 = .58. Post-hoc analyses also
confirmed simple main effects for block condition on congruent trials, F (1, 38) = 7.30, p < .05,
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= .16, and mixed block condition, F (1, 38) = 18.63, p < .01, ηp = .33. As shown in Figure 9,
2

participants were most accurate on mixed congruent trials (M = .96, SE = .01) and blocked
congruent trials (M = .95, SE = .01) and had more difficulty on blocked incongruent trials (M =
.92, SE = .01) and mix congruent trials (M = .89, SE = .01). Diagnostic group and other
interaction factors between variables were not significant (p’s >.05).
Figure 9. Interaction of Block Condition x Congruency on Accuracy

Hypothesis 2a (N200 ERP amplitude). Hypothesis 2a predicted that a neural correlate
of interference processing would be observed in increased amplitude at central electrode sites
occurring 225 to 325 ms post stimulus onset (N200 ERP component) for incongruent compared
to congruent conditions. A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to compare the main
effects of block condition, congruency, and diagnostic group and the interaction effects between
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these variables on N200 amplitude. No significant main effects or interaction effects were
observed (p’s >.05).
Hypothesis 2b (N200 ERP latency). Hypothesis 2b predicted that a neural correlate of
interference processing would be observed in delayed onset (peak latency) of the N200
component for incongruent compared to congruent conditions. A repeated measures ANOVA
was conducted to compare the main effects of block condition, congruency, and diagnostic group
and the interaction effects between these variables on N200 latency. A significant main effect
was found for congruency, F (1, 36) = 10.09, p < .01, ηp2 = .22. As hypothesized and shown in
Figure 10, onset of N200 was delayed for incongruent conditions (M = 274.63, SE = 2.65)
compared to congruent conditions (M = 269.79, SD = 2.88). No additional significant main
effects or interaction effects were observed (p’s >.05).
Figure 10. Main Effect of Congruency on N200 Latency

Hypothesis 3a (N450 ERP amplitude). Hypothesis 3a predicted that a neural correlate
of interference processing would be observed in increased negativity at central electrode sites
occurring 350 to 500 ms post stimulus onset (N450) for incongruent compared to congruent
conditions. A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to compare the main effects of block
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condition, congruency, and diagnostic group and the interaction effects between these variables
on N450 amplitude. A main effect was observed for congruency (see Figure 11), F (1, 36) =
5.94, p < .05, ηp2 = .14. As hypothesized, incongruent conditions resulted in more negative
amplitude at N450 (M = 1.59, SE = .32) than congruent conditions (M = 1.99, SE = .30). A main
effect was also observed for block condition (see Figure 12), F (1, 36) = 4.15, p < .05, ηp2 = .10,
in that N4 amplitude was larger for mixed conditions (M = 1.58, SE = .32) in comparison to
blocked conditions (M = 2.00, SE = .32).
Figure 11. Main Effect of Congruency on N450 Amplitude

Figure 12. Main Effect of Block Condition on N450 Amplitude
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Additionally, a significant interaction for block condition by congruency was observed, F
(1, 36) = 5.76, p < .05, ηp2 = .14. Holm’s sequential Bonferroni post-hoc analyses revealed a
simple main effect for congruency on blocked trials, F (1, 37) = 12.79, p < .01, ηp2 = .26, and a
simple main effect for block condition on congruency, F (1, 37) = 8.96, p < .01, ηp2 = .20. As
displayed in Figure 13, N450 amplitude was larger for blocked incongruent trials (M =1.67, SE =
.33) compared to blocked congruent trials (M = 2.39, SE = .35). Additionally, N450 amplitude
was larger for mixed congruent trials (M = 1.64, SE = .32) than blocked congruent trials (M =
2.39, SE = .35). Diagnostic group and remaining interaction factors between variables were not
significant (p’s >.05).
Figure 13. Interaction of Block Condition x Congruency on N450 Amplitude

Hypothesis 3b (N450 latency). Hypothesis 3b stated that a neural correlate of
interference processing would be observed in delayed onset (peak latency) of the N450
component for incongruent compared to congruent conditions. A repeated measures ANOVA
was conducted to compare the main effects of block condition, congruency, and diagnostic group
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and the interaction effects between these variables on N450 latency. Contrary to the proposed
hypothesis, no significant main effects or interaction effects were observed (p’s >.05).
Aim 2 (Positive Affect)
A series of hierarchical regressions were conducted to examine Aim 2 regarding the
effect of positive affect (PA) on performance during incongruent trials during blocked and mixed
conditions of the Color-Word Stroop Task. For all regression models, Group (Healthy Controls =
0, Remitted Depressed = 1) was entered in the first step, Affect (PA) was entered in the second
step, and the interaction of Group x Affect was entered in the third step. Outcome variables were
behavioral and ERP data (see Figure 14). All interaction tests, including post-hoc tests when
applicable, were conducted using the approach for depicting interaction effects described in
Aiken and West (1991). Significant findings are reviewed below and regression results for all
models can be found in Table 4 and 5.
Figure 14. Aim 2 Regression Analyses
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Note. Diagnostic group, PA, Group x PA are entered sequentially as independent variables. Behavioral outcomes are
indicated in light grey and ERP outcomes in dark grey boxes. Hierarchical linear regression analyses were
conducted for blocked and mixed conditions of incongruent trials.

A power analysis with a significance level of p <.05 (Aiken & West, 1991; Cohen, 1992)
was conducted using G*Power version 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, Buchner, 2007) to determine
whether the sample size was appropriate to detect hypothesized effects. A review of literature
regarding induced mood state and cognition indicated power for a medium effect size (Rowe et
al., 2007; Gray 2001). Given that the effects of natural mood state on cognition is unknown,
analyses were conducted for both medium and large effect sizes. The power analysis indicated
that a total sample of N = 36 participants would be needed to detect a large effect size and a total
sample of N = 77 would be need to detect a medium effect size. As such the following results are
sufficiently powered to detect a large effect size and underpowered to detect a medium or
smaller effect.
Stroop interference – reaction time. Regression analyses for incongruent trials in the
blocked and mixed conditions showed that group, PA, and Group x PA were not significant
predictors of Stroop Interference – Reaction Time.
Stroop interference – accuracy. Regression analyses for incongruent trials in the
blocked and mixed condition did not elicit significant models for Stroop Interference - Accuracy.
N200 amplitude. Results from the first step of the regression analyses showed that
diagnostic history significantly contributed to the regression model, F (1,34) = 4.93, p < .05) and
accounted for 10% of the variance in N200 amplitude for incongruent trials in the blocked
condition. Findings showed that the remitted depression group demonstrated more negative
N200 amplitude ( = -.36, p < .05) than the healthy control group on blocked incongruent trials.
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PA and Group x PA did not contribute significantly to the regression model, F (2,33) = 2.40, p >
.05; F (3,32) = 2.16, p < .05, respectively. Regression analyses for the same trials in the mixed
condition did not elicit significant models.
N200 latency. Results from the first step of the regression analyses showed that
diagnostic history significantly contributed to the regression model, F (1,34) = 5.10, p < .05 and
accounted for 13% of the variance in N200 latency for incongruent trials in the blocked
condition. Findings showed that the remitted depression group exhibited later onset of N200 ( =
.36, p < .05) than the healthy control group on blocked incongruent trials. PA did not
significantly contribute to the regression model, F (2,33) = 2.55, p > .05. Group x PA
significantly predicted N200 latency, F (3,32) = 3.55, p < .05, and accounted for an additional
12% of the variance in N200 latency during the mixed congruent condition. As shown in Figure
15, findings indicated that at higher levels of PA those in the remitted depressed group
demonstrated later onset N200 and those in the healthy control demonstrated earlier onset N200
on blocked incongruent trials ( = 1.61, p < .05). Regression analyses for the same trials in the
mixed condition did not elicit significant models for N200 Latency.
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Figure 15. N200 ERP Latency Predicted by Group x PA

N450 amplitude. Results showed that diagnostic history contributed significantly to the
regression model, F (1,34) = 5.60, p< .05) and accounted for 14% of the variance in N450
latency for incongruent trials in the blocked condition. Findings showed that the remitted
depression group demonstrated more negative N450 amplitude ( = -.38, p < .05) than the
healthy control group on blocked incongruent trials. PA and Group x PA did not contribute
significantly to the regression model, F (2,33) = 2.78, p> .05 and F (3,32) = 1.79, p > .05,
respectively. Regression analyses for the mixed condition did not elicit significant models.
N450 latency. Regression analyses for incongruent trials in the blocked and mixed
condition not elicit significant models for N450 latency.
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Table 4. Regression Summary Statistics for Blocked Incongruent Trials
A) Reaction Time
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

B

SE B

β

B

SE B

β

B

SE B

β

-4.21

25.39

-.03

-4.81

26.03

-.03

182.16

119.74

1.23

PA

--

--

--

-.33

2.12

-.03

3.33

3.06

.27

Group * PA

--

--

--

--

--

--

-6.63

4.15

-1.28

Variable
Diagnostic Group

R2 Change

.00

.00

.07

F for change in R2

.03

.03

2.55

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

B) Accuracy

B

SE B

β

B

SE B

β

B

SE B

β

Diagnostic Group

.02

.01

.26

.02

.01

.24

.04

.06

.59

PA

--

--

--

.00

.00

-.11

.00

.00

-.03

Group * PA

--

--

--

--

--

--

.00

.00

-.36

Variable

R2 Change

.07

.01

.01

F for change in R2

2.36

.41

.20

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

C) N200 Amplitude

B

SE B

β

B

SE B

β

B

SE B

β

-1.27

.57

-.36*

-1.27

.59

-.36*

-4.67

2.74

-1.31

PA

--

--

--

.00

.05

.00

-.07

.07

-.22

Group * PA

--

--

--

--

--

--

.12

.10

.97

Variable
Diagnostic Group

R2 Change
F for change in R2

.13

.00

.04

4.93*

.00

1.61
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D) N200 Latency
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

B

SE B

β

B

SE B

β

B

SE B

β

13.11

5.80

.36*

13.41

5.94

.37*

-43.97

26.42

-1.21

PA

--

--

--

.17

.48

.06

-.93

.68

-.32

Group * PA

--

--

--

--

--

--

2.04

.92

1.61*

Variable
Diagnostic Group

R2 Change
F for change in R2

.13

.00

.12

5.10*

.13

4.94*

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

E) N450 Amplitude

B

SE B

β

B

SE B

β

B

SE B

β

-2.57

.66

-.38*

-1.55

.68

-.37*

-1.48

3.25

-.36

PA

--

--

--

.01

.06

.04

.02

.08

.05

Group * PA

--

--

--

--

--

--

.00

.11

-.02

Variable
Diagnostic Group

R2 Change
F for change in R2

.14

.00

.00

5.60*

.07

.00

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

F) N450 Latency

B

SE B

β

B

SE B

β

B

SE B

β

6.88

11.67

.10

6.37

11.96

.09

-50.91

56.21

-.74

PA

--

--

--

-.29

.97

-.05

-1.39

1.44

-.25

Group * PA

--

--

--

--

--

--

2.03

1.95

.85

Variable
Diagnostic Group

R2 Change

.01

.00

.03

F for change in R2

.35

.09

1.09

* p < .05
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Table 5. Regression Summary Statistics for Mixed Incongruent Trials
A) Reaction Time
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

B

SE B

β

B

SE B

β

B

SE B

β

-7.21

21.81

-.06

-12.40

21.49

-.10

11.73

102.59

.09

PA

--

--

--

-2.02

1.75

-.28

-2.45

2.62

-.24

Group * PA

--

--

--

--

--

--

-.86

3.56

-.19

Variable
Diagnostic Group

R2 Change

.00

.08

.00

F for change in R2

.11

2.80

.06

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

B) Accuracy

B

SE B

β

B

SE B

β

B

SE B

β

Diagnostic Group

.03

.02

.21

.02

.02

.18

.09

.10

.73

PA

--

--

--

.00

.00

-.18

.00

.00

-.05

Group * PA

--

--

--

--

--

--

.00

.00

-.56

Variable

R2 Change

.04

.03

.01

F for change in R2

1.52

1.06

.48

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

C) N200 Amplitude

B

SE B

β

B

SE B

β

B

SE B

β

-1.00

.65

-.26

-1.11

.65

-.28

-.99

3.11

-.25

PA

--

--

--

-.06

.05

-.19

-.06

.08

-.18

Group * PA

--

--

--

--

--

--

.00

.11

-.03

Variable
Diagnostic Group

R2 Change

.07

.04

.00

F for change in R2

2.40

1.30

.00
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D) N200 Latency
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

B

SE B

β

B

SE B

β

B

SE B

β

9.05

5.73

.26

10.09

5.75

.29

-32.72

26.36

-.95

PA

--

--

--

.58

.47

.21

-.25

.67

-.09

Group * PA

--

--

--

--

--

--

1.52

.91

1.26

Variable
Diagnostic Group

R2 Change

.07

.04

.07

F for change in R2

2.50

1.55

2.76

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

E) N450 Amplitude

B

SE B

β

B

SE B

β

B

SE B

β

-1.06

.76

-.23

-1.21

.76

-.26

3.00

3.57

.66

PA

--

--

--

-.08

.06

-.23

.00

.09

.00

Group * PA

--

--

--

--

--

--

-.15

.12

-.94

Variable
Diagnostic Group

R2 Change

.05

.05

.04

F for change in R2

1.92

1.84

1.46

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

F) N450 Latency

B

SE B

β

B

SE B

β

B

SE B

β

19.52

12.04

.27

20.13

12.33

.28

-102.13

54.60

-1.40

PA

--

--

--

.35

1.00

.06

-2.02

1.40

-.34

Group * PA

--

--

--

--

--

--

4.34

1.89

1.71*

Variable
Diagnostic Group

R2 Change

.07

.00

.13

F for change in R2

2.63

.12

5.25*

* p < .05
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CHAPTER FIVE
DISCUSSION
Overview
As deficits in cognitive and emotional functioning are well documented across many
neurological disorders (e.g., depression, Alzheimer’s disease, and epilepsy), advancing our
understanding of the interaction between cognitive and emotional processes in both normal and
abnormal functioning is critical to further elucidating etiological and maintenance factors of
emotional and cognitive dysfunction (Pessoa, 2008). In addition to implications for pathological
conditions, understanding the nuanced impact of state affect on cognitive processes, such as
cognitive control functions, is central to discerning optimal levels of mood in the completion of
everyday activities as well. While a robust body of literature details the curvilinear nature of
“optimal” anxiety/arousal (i.e., Zone of Optimal Functioning; Hanin, 1980), the “optimal” levels
of positive or negative affect for different cognitive demands are not as well defined. In fact,
empirical findings and theoretical models regarding the impact of positive and negative affect on
cognitive control processes are riddled with inconsistent and at times contradictory messages.
Therefore, the purpose of the present study was to replicate and expand upon previous research
by examining behavioral and neural correlates of interference processing during the CWST and
to evaluate the impact of varying levels of positive affect on performance.
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As expected from previous findings (e.g., MacLeod, 1991; Harnishfeger, 1995; West,
2004; Silton et al., 2011), incongruent trials on the CWST in the present study resulted in
increased difficulty (i.e., increased reaction time and error rate) and increased recruitment of
neural resources (e.g., increased ERP amplitude) compared to congruent trials. In addition to
similarities in observed outcomes across blocked and mixed paradigms of the CWST, differences
in interference processing across conditions were significant and provide insight into discrepant
findings in the literature.
While little is known regarding the influences of naturally occurring positive affect and
previous psychopathology on the recruitment/allocation of cognitive control resources, evidence
from several studies indicate that these factors may indeed play a role in behavioral and
neurophysiological response (Hur et al., 2015; Heller, 1993; Liotti et al., 2002). In fact, the
interplay between cognitive and affective processing is evident within the structural and
functional organization of the cortex, such that frontocingulate cortical structures that support
affective function also are engaged during cognitive tasks, and vice versa (Mohanty et al., 2007;
Blanchette and Richards, 2009). Findings from the limited studies that have investigated the
influence of PA on interference processing during the CWST are inconsistent, in that high levels
of PA were found to either have a deleterious effect (Yuan et al., 2011; Phillips, Bull, Adams and
Fraser 2002) or did not influence performance (Martin & Kerns, 2010). Of note, these
investigations did not report nor account for lifetime history of depression. In the present study,
PA was found to moderate the relationship between diagnostic group and onset of N200 during
blocked incongruent trials. At high levels of PA, N200 peak latency was delayed in the remitted
depressed group and had an earlier onset in the healthy control group. These findings expand
upon previous literature that has identified pervasive cognitive and emotional processing
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differences in individuals with remitted depression (Paelecke-Habermann, Pohl, & Leplow,
2005) and suggest that the differential effects of emotional state upon cognitive control is
dependent upon history of psychopathology.
Interference Processing
Interference processing occurs when the presentation of task-irrelevant information
conflicts with task-relevant information. Therefore, in order to successfully complete a task in
the context of interference, an individual must disregard irrelevant data in favor of task-relevant
information. In the CWST, interference processing is pronounced as task-irrelevant information
is characterized as an automatic/habituated process that is in direct conflict with the prioritization
of task-relevant information that requires effortful processing (MacLeod, 1991; Kahneman and
Chajczyk, 1983). While findings in the extant literature illustrate a consistent pattern of
behavioral outcomes (i.e., increased reaction time and decreased accuracy for incongruent trials),
data detailing neural correlates of interference processing are inconsistent in regards to relevant
ERP components and corresponding neural generators (Harnishfeger, 1995; MacLeod, 1991;
Lufi, Cohen & Parnish-Plass, 1990; Wagner et al., 2006; West, 2004; Silton et al., 2011).
Behavioral and Neural Correlates of Interference Processing
Several behavioral and neural correlates of interference processing were observed in both
blocked and mixed CWST conditions and underscore the robust effects of interference
processing that transcends factors such as diagnostic group and task presentation. Replicating
and building upon previous research (MacLeod, 1991; Silton et al., 2011), both healthy control
and remitted depressed groups showed behavioral costs of interference processing in increased
reaction time and decreased accuracy for incongruent compared to congruent trials in blocked
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and mixed conditions. Additionally, increased Stroop interference-accuracy for blocked trials
was related to increased Stroop interference- accuracy for mixed trials for both groups.
While differences in N200 amplitude for incongruent compared to congruent trials have
been observed in other studies (Holmes and Pizzagalli, 2008; Silton et al., 2010), N200
amplitude was not significantly influenced by congruency in the present study. However,
incongruent trials resulted in delayed onset of N200 peak latency compared to congruent trials
across both blocked or mixed presentations. Taken together, these findings in combination with
relevant literature (Holmes and Pizzagalli, 2008; Silton et al., 2011) further establish N200 as a
marker of interference processing. In the context of interference processing, N200 has been
associated with the detection of conflict and source localization analyses have identified regions
within the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) as a potential generator (West, Krompinger, Bowry &
Doll, 2004; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008; van Veen & Carter, 2002).
Shortly after N200, N450 was observed in the present study, which is similarly thought to
reflect ACC function. While there is currently debate within the literature as to whether N450 is
reflective of conflict detection (Hanslmayr et al., 2008; Szucs and Soltesz, 2012) or response
resolution (Liotti et al., 2000), it is generally agreed upon that increased N450 amplitude is
associated with increased engagement of cognitive control abilities in relation to task demands.
Consistent with observed behavioral differences between blocked and mixed conditions in the
present study, N450 amplitude was attenuated in the blocked condition for congruent trials.
These findings suggest that additional cognitive resources are recruited in order to successfully
meet the higher task demands of a mixed presentation (e.g., switching between congruent and
incongruent stimuli) compared to a blocked presentation. In the present study, N450 amplitude
differentiated congruency conditions only in the blocked presentation. Since N450 amplitude did
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not differ for congruent and incongruent trials in the mixed block presentation, this finding
suggests that increased N450 amplitude reflects a broader recruitment of cognitive control
resources rather than those specific to interference processing. Despite observed behavioral and
N450 differences between blocked and mixed conditions, no significant differences in N200
were observed which further establishes N200 as an indicator of conflict detection.
Lifetime History of Depression and PA Influence CWST Performance
In order to investigate the influence of affect on cognitive function with consideration for
long-term implications of previous psychopathology, individuals with a lifetime history of
depression as well as healthy controls participated in the present study. While there is evidence
for residual low levels of PA, often characterized as anhedonia, in individuals with remitted
depression (Wichers, Geschwind, van Os & Peeters, 2010; DelDonno et al., 2017), other findings
have found no difference in dimensional ratings of mood/depressive symptom severity in
remitted depression (Vanderhasselt, De Raedt, Dillon, Dutra, Brooks & Pizzagalli, 2012;
Bylsma, Salomon, Clift, Morris & Rottenberg, 2014). In the present study, there were no
significant differences between current depression severity as measured by the PHQ-9 or levels
of PA or NA between healthy control and remitted depressed groups. Diagnostic group was a
significant predictor of several ERP outcomes during the blocked condition of the CWST.
Specifically, more negative N200 and N450 amplitude were observed for the remitted depression
group compared to the healthy control group on blocked incongruent trials. This expands upon
previous research (Vanderhassel et al., 2012) detailing the residual impact of remitted depression
on cognition and reflects the greater recruitment of cognitive resources in order to complete task
demands. Additionally, the remitted depression group exhibited later onset of N200 than the
healthy control group on blocked incongruent trials. While self-reported PA alone did not
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significantly predict behavioral or neural outcome measures, PA was found to moderate the
relationship between diagnostic group and N200 latency, in that higher levels of PA were related
to later onset N200 for the remitted depressed group and earlier N200 onset for the healthy
control group on blocked incongruent trials. This finding calls attention to the differential affect
PA has on cognitive control processes in the context of history of psychopathology and may
further account for some of the differences found in existing research as both dimensional and
categorical classifications of emotional functioning are not frequently examined in the same
study. Lastly, diagnostic history and level of PA were not significant predictors of behavioral or
ERP outcomes for incongruent trials during the mixed condition or behavioral outcomes in either
condition. The discrepancy between conditions likely speaks to the difference in task demands
and nuances of cognitive control processes.
Limitations and Future Directions
The present study had several limitations that are discussed below. The final participant
sample was relatively small, limiting the power to detect small to moderate effects across
analyses. The participant sample was also predominantly Caucasian with limited diversity across
other ethnicity or racial groups. Although an area of strength in terms of understanding affective
and cognitive control processes in early adulthood, the limited age range of the present sample
also limits generalizability to younger or older populations.
While this study expands upon existing CWST findings with the incorporation of
congruent/incongruent trials presented in blocked and mixed conditions, the absence of a neutral
condition limits comparisons to the absolute differences between congruency conditions. In
addition to accounting for possible facilitative effects in congruent task demands, the inclusion of
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a neutral condition would provide an additional comparison condition to better elucidate what
cognitive processes are sensitive to high/low levels of PA and remitted depression.
Currently, emotional experience and diagnostic history of mood disorder are infrequently
assessed in cognitive neuroscience research unless emotional constructs are central to study
aims. Looking to the future, the interplay of affective and cognitive processes should be further
investigated to include other cognitive control functions and negative affect. Also, given strong
empirical evidence for the affective role of intensity, frequency, and arousal variables (Brown,
Chorpita & Barlow, 1998; Diener, Larsen, Levine & Emmons, 1985; Heller, 1993),
consideration of these constructs is warranted.
Conclusions
In sum, the results of this study expand upon existing literature regarding recruitment of
neural processes during different conditions of a CWST while also offering novel insight
regarding the influence of low/high PA in the context of remitted depression. While similar
patterns were observed for blocked and mixed conditions (i.e., behavioral measures of Stroop
interference as well as N200 and N450 ERP components), significant effects were also observed
for condition on behavioral and ERP outcomes such as attenuated N450 amplitude for congruent
blocked trials and increased response latency for mixed trials. Differences between blocked and
mixed conditions underscore that while Stroop interference is a robust effect involving conflict
detection and response resolution, the strength of this effect is sensitive to task design and
variations in task design have likely contributed to conflicting findings in CWST literature.
Further, similarities between N450 amplitude for mixed congruent and mixed incongruent trials
indicates that N450 may not be a direct correlate of conflict detection, but rather broader
recruitment of cognitive control resources. Findings from the present study also provide further
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evidence for residual effects of remitted depression on cognitive control processes and indicate
that high levels of PA moderate the relationship between lifetime history of depression and
neural processing during the CWST. Higher levels of PA were related to later onset N200 for the
remitted depressed group and earlier N200 onset for the healthy control group on blocked
incongruent trials. This suggests that high PA may have a facilitative effect in the recruitment of
neural resources for individuals without a history of depression, but that the same effect is not
observed in individuals with a lifetime history of depression. These findings further establish the
interplay between affective and cognitive processes and posit that this relationship is malleable
with consideration for individual history of psychopathology.
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APPENDIX A
SELF-REPORT MEASURE OF STATE AFFECT
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PANAS
This scale consists of a number of words and phrases that describe different feelings and emotions. Read
each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to the word. Indicate to what extent
you feeling this way right now, that is, at the present moment. Use these numbers to record your answers.
1
very slightly
or not at all

2
a little

3
moderately

4
quite a bit

5
extremely

_____ cheerful

_____ sad

_____ active

_____ guilty

_____ enthusiastic

_____ attentive

_____ afraid

_____ joyful

_____ downhearted

_____ nervous

_____ distressed

_____ happy

_____ excited

_____ determined

_____ strong

_____ hostile

_____ proud

_____ alert

_____ jittery

_____ interested

_____ irritable

_____ upset

_____ delighted

_____ ashamed

_____ inspired

_____ blue

_____ scared
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